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Abstract 
Alabama, 1933. A caravan of limousines carrying gangsters arrives in Manderlay, a small village where 
slavery still exists as an institution. Mam (Lauren Bacall) rules the plantation assisted by her foreman 
Wilhelm (Danny Glover), a slave who believes his people are not ready for the responsibilities of freedom. 
Driving up to the gates of the plantation, Grace (Bryce Dallas Howard) declares that the slaves must be 
informed how to enjoy freedom and thus becoming good citizens. Drawing on a textual and visual analysis 
of Manderlay, the article explores how democracy arises from the exercise of violence and power, as well 
as the inability of Western societies to deal with the dogma of difference.    
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Power, command and violence in von Trier’s Manderlay:  
A political and philosophical analysis of pseudo-democracies 
 
 
Sara Marino 
 
Dogville and Manderlay: A manifesto for Western’ hypocrisy   
It was their wonder, astonishment, that first 
led men to philosophize and still leads them. 
Aristotle, Metaphysics 
 
This article originates from a principle that, according to Aristotle, is at the core of 
human knowledge: the astonishment. But the object of this astonishment, and therefore what is at 
the center of this article to investigate, is not what we might define an ‘happy ending’. Is 
humans’ ability to destroy other human beings; is the omnipresence of human violence and the 
very concrete eventuality of its triumph, to a point that ‘killing others’ is probably what we love, 
and we are addicted to, most (Canetti, 1962; Author, 2009). This article is about violence or, to 
say it better, it is about the relationship between violence and democracy, violence and 
citizenship. But it is not just that. It is also about a specific message that controversial Danish 
filmmaker Lars von Trier spread through his USA: Land of Opportunity incomplete trilogy: 
Dogville (first chapter, 2003) and Manderlay (second chapter, 2005). Yet Manderlay is a 
complex film that has produced multiple interpretations, together with enthusiastic or merciless 
critics. Some called it racist and anti-American; others claimed that the film was a cinematic 
condemnation of Bush’s war in Iraq. Yet, as I would argue, Manderlay is a lot more, it is a 
cinema that becomes theatre that becomes literature; but also, more importantly, it is a public 
statement of how Western morality is ideologically contaminated by hierarchies of power and 
mechanisms of social exclusion. Manderlay is, first and foremost, a reflection upon abstract 
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notions of humanity, a critique of American liberal politics, a public condemnation of 
conservative racial politics. In this respect, it works as a mirror of past and present attempts to 
colonize parts of the world that Western societies described as uncivilized, in the name of human 
rights and using violence as a mean of communication. 
Manderlay explores, as we will see, the development of an individual’s moral idea in 
a democratic system of power. In some respects, Dogville already launched this long run towards 
the commercialization of human rights. Grace, the female protagonist, embodied this political 
theology since the very beginning of von Trier’s manifesto. Acting from below, as a prey caught 
in a liminal status (Fitzpatrick and Tuitt, 2004), Grace explored the various forms of 
unconditional dedication to others by offering herself to the citizens of Dogville, without asking 
for nothing in return. As Tom (Paul Bettany), a young self-appointed intellectual has hoped since 
he met Grace for the very first time, she had to unravel humans’ capacity to embrace otherness 
and sustain the town’s morale re-armament (Author, 2013). Prone to search the depths of the 
human soul to find answers, he concludes that the only way to rearm the moral principle of 
acceptance and tolerance is to provide a tangible illustration, meaning the accommodation of a 
fugitive. In Manderlay, Grace acts from above: she becomes a lawgiver, she controls the law, 
and she has the power to decide for the life of the inhabitants.  And yet, both experiments equally 
and miserably fail. At Dogville, Grace must face the truth: people are not naturally good, as she 
wanted to demonstrate to her father, but intrinsically merciless and depraved. She feels that, on 
her body and soul: during her stay she has been continuously raped and abused, she has been 
treated like an animal, forced to work for less money and more hours, with no voice or right to 
claim her needs. An escalation of violence that reached the grand finale when Grace was forced 
to walk in chains and to announce herself through the sound of a bell, attached to her neck after 
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an attempt to escape (Author, 2013).  
At Manderlay, it is democracy that ultimately fails. The moral lessons, through 
which Grace should have taught the former slaves how to become good citizens and enjoy 
freedom, do not teach anything; on the contrary, they worsen what was, we should admit, a 
rather stable situation. We should have not expected anything different, after all. If it is true, as 
we will see, that Grace teaches the Afro-American slaves the rudiments of democracy, we must 
not forget that she does so while escorted by a bunch of armed gangsters. In other words, what 
Grace does is to replace what she considers an unacceptable violence with a more ‘legitimized’ 
violence, as it were; she exercises the right to impose some sort of ‘justice’ from a position of 
power and white-race superiority - the same she believes she is fighting against. Moreover, 
nobody has elected her; she did not even ask the slaves what they wanted and what their opinion 
was. Dogville’s lesson has not been learned: physical and morale slavery is hard to eradicate.  
This brief introduction is to say that, by looking at how Grace establishes her 
definition of democratic power over people that did not ask for it, I aim to demonstrate that at the 
bottom of the foundation of every social order lies a more or less visible amount of violence, 
which supports the exercise of power and the definition of law.  
The current analysis is set within a very specific political and philosophical 
framework that calls into question René Girard’s philosophy of power and Arnold Gehlen’s 
theory of human nature as deficient and intrinsically sick, as main references. Inspired by the 
idea that democracy does not mean ‘government by the people’, as its traditional definition says, 
but it is instead a form of legitimate coercion that hides traces of primitive violence, this article 
will also take into consideration examples from political theology and critiques of liberalism in 
order to spoil one of the main messages that Manderlay conveys: that democracy, ultimately, 
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reveals aspects of an enlightened dictatorship, and that Western societies are nurturing this 
magnificent fabrication under the name of human rights.  
According to Girard, human beings are generated in violence, and violence is the 
first symbolic language with which individuals define themselves and their relation with nature 
and others human beings (Girard, 1987). Dogville and Manderlay should therefore be seen as 
social and moral experiments that reflect humans’ social and cultural conditions: ultimately, the 
secret humans’ addiction to violence and power. Manderlay is all about violence: as spectators, 
we see violence since the very first scene, when a woman cries for help as a black man is about 
to be whipped inside the plantation. We see violence when we realize that slavery still exists -
something we cannot tolerate as citizens living in a free world; we see violence when things start 
going wrong, throughout the storm, the harvest, the famine. It is constantly, repeatedly, a circle 
of violence and counter-violence that never stopped since Dogville was shut down in an 
apocalyptic destructive force (Author, 2013).  
Similarly to the first chapter, even Manderlay does not give hope a chance; even the 
dream of a liberal democratic polity fails, to a point that after the initial adversities seem 
resolved, the community self-destructs. Set off by the theft of the harvest profits, Manderlay 
reveals its inability to live without rules, in a coercive situation of predesigned roles and 
responsibilities.  
The aim of the article is to understand Manderlay as a sociological and analytical 
experiment that penetrates at the heart of the foundations of our contemporary social institutions. 
The film exposes, critiques, and offers a valid alternative to the generalized hypocrisy that 
dresses up present attempts to democratize some parts of the world, in the name of human rights. 
Democracy is not without consequences, and cannot be taught to people that are not ready for 
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that. After all, what we call ‘democratic’ is the result of centuries of wars, deprivations, 
genocides, internal fights, bodies covered in blood and artificial peace (De Simone et al., 2007). 
We should have learned that social construct is not social consent, and that in order to be free we 
need someone to decide what is right and what is wrong, who can be accepted and who cannot, 
who can die without no one claiming for his/her death, and whose bodies are more relevant.  
In this respect, Dogville and Manderlay can be said to explore the ways in which 
moral liberalism and enforced democracy might, in pious forms, lead to exploitation and 
dictatorial vengeance. In Dogville von Trier explored the idea that power and cruelty are 
mutually reinforcing the interdependence of charity and exploitation, credit and debt, cruelty and 
revenge. In Manderlay, issues of power and command are intertwined with concepts such as 
citizenship, human rights, and democracy.  
Few questions remain to be answered. Is Manderlay the symbol of something we are 
still doing today? Are we similar to Grace’s noxious stubbornness in our attempts to teach the 
new generations how to become good citizens in a free world? How to claim for legitimate 
rights? How to become morally exemplary? Perhaps democracy is not the best political system in 
a free society; perhaps democracy must be supported by the use of guns in order to be effective. 
This article does not intend to reach a conclusive understanding of the issues here under 
investigation; instead, it raises some kind of awareness and reflection over the commodification 
of the cinematic medium.  
 
Manderlay: a brief history 
Before entering the political analysis of Manderlay and its social manifesto, I will 
briefly introduce the storyline of the place and its inhabitants. Following Dogville, von Trier 
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replicates the same architectural and temporal sequences that characterized the first chapter as a 
unique in cinematic productions. Once again, the external voice-over (John Hurt) speaks to us 
while leading the spectator in a theatrical mise-en-scène. His voice -strong, masculine, mid-
Atlantic, and authoritative- stands against the sterility of the plantation set. When shot from 
above, we recognize the attention to few minimalist details: a two-dimensional map come 
alive, with cars crossing thick black borders and bodies congregating in textually demarcated 
spaces. Inside Manderlay, there are only the most minimal props on the stage: Mam’s bed, the 
pillars representing the plantation house, a few pieces of wood representing the slave cabins; 
and one or two other props. The locations are designated with labels that are written on the 
floor in white lettering. Even the space tells us that a scientific experiment is on set; in this 
respect, it is not just the Brechtian configuration of space that makes this place a theatre, but 
also the fact that everything happens in a circumscribed space: it is a cancellation of the world 
as we are used to see (Koutsourakis, 2013).  
In this second chapter of the USA trilogy, set in 1933 Alabama, Grace (Bryce Dallas-
Howard) is travelling with her father and a group of gangsters when suddenly a woman appears 
crying for help, as one of the inhabitant is about to be whipped for having stolen a bottle of wine. 
Once again contradicting the orders of her father, who argues that what is happening is ‘a local 
matter’ that they should respect, Grace enters the plantation and realises that slavery still exists, 
roughly 70 years after the American Civil War and the Emancipation Proclamation, and that a 
community of African-Americans is living under the control of white owners. Grace informs the 
slaves that they are free by law and, with the help of a few of her father’s gangsters, takes up 
residence at the plantation to facilitate the transition to freedom.  
There is no question, any discussion or mutual agreement: Manderlay is ‘a moral 
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obligation’ that has to be fixed as rapidly as possible, hopefully in the smoothest and effective 
way. Shortly after Grace’s father and the remaining gangsters depart, Mam, the master of the 
house, dies, but not before asking Grace to burn a notebook containing the Law, a code of 
conduct for the plantation and all its inhabitants, both free and slave. The whole Manderlay 
system is based on a psychological division of the slaves, a bondage that speaks the language of 
psychology: each variety has its own description, which accounts for different amounts of food 
and different levels of privileges. The slaves are categorized as follows: the proud nigger, the 
talking nigger, the weeping nigger, the hitting nigger, the clowning nigger, the loser nigger and 
finally the pleasing nigger -the most dangerous figure, ‘also known as a chameleon, a person of 
the kind who can transform himself into the type the beholder would like to see’ (John Hurt). 
Mam’s law decides on everything that happens within the village, thus providing a time/place for 
the every day’s living.  Among these rules, it is stated that the slaves must line up in a particular 
part of the plantation each day because that is the only part of the plantation that has shade 
during the hottest part of the day; paper money is prohibited so it is not gambled away by the 
slaves, and it is also prohibited to cut down the trees of the Old Lady’s Garden, because they 
block the wind from covering crops with dust. Graces refuses to burn the law, as she wants to 
make the slaves aware of the principles contained in it. Before revealing it these rules though, 
Grace orders her lawyer to draw up contracts for all the inhabitants, institutionalizing a 
communistic form of cooperative living in which the former employers now work as slaves and 
the blacks collectively own the plantation and its crops.   
Socialism enters the plantation: there will not be salaried workers, but the land will 
be owned in a communal ownership. A dream in theory, the redefinition of roles and 
responsibilities in fact complicates the situation even more. Grace expects ‘the bourgeoning 
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change of character that freedom ought to bring’, but she sees the former slaves carrying on as 
they had before, regardless of who holds the power. Nevertheless, Grace carries on with her 
mission: unlike the character we met in Dogville, a prey begging for the gift of acceptance, this 
Grace is an unfiltered idealist: she is strong-willed, smart, transparent, talkative, and a believer 
(Author, 2013). Ultimately though, she must accept that the shift towards democracy is not as 
easy as expected. The slaves fail to conform to the democratic social norms; in one word, the 
empowerment fails when she disempowers the community. Without no rules, without no one 
telling them what to eat, at what time, in which order, the slaves loose themselves, to a point that 
Timothy -the pleasing nigger Grace fells is love with- gambles the community’s profits from the 
harvest. The experiment fails completely. First, the community turns in on itself, with its newly 
‘liberated’ members using the democratic processes just established to their own advantage and 
in inappropriate ways (voting on when a jokester can laugh at his own jokes or sentencing Wilma 
to death, accused of stealing food). Finally, the community self-destructs. Set off by the theft of 
the harvest profits, Manderlay goes up in flames. Finally admitting her failure, Grace contacts 
her father and attempts to leave the plantation only to be stopped by the plantation’s blacks. At 
this point it is revealed that Mam’s Law was not conceived by Mam or any of the other whites, 
but instead by Wilhelm, the community’s eldest member, as a means of maintaining the status 
quo after the abolition of slavery, protecting the blacks from a hostile outside world. As this 
revelation was not enough, in the film’s last sequences the community asks Grace to be the new 
Mam, and therefore to punish Timothy for his ‘anti-democratic’ behaviour. She refuses, at first, 
but a final lesson has to be given. She punishes Timothy, who shouts back to Grace: ‘Aren’t you 
forgetting something? You made us!’ The failure is complete, Grace misses the appointment 
with her father, who left the plantation after seeing the daughter whipping Timothy and thus re-
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stabilizing the order.  Liberalism has failed. Empowerment did not end oppression; it merely 
transfigured oppression. 
 
Democracy is governed by power and every form of power is ruled by violence  
The idea that violence is antithetical to democratic principles is not just seductive; 
it is also very critical. Recent attempts to untangle the relationship between violence and 
democracy have generally assumed the contours of a link between violence, security, and 
democracy. After all, the increased degree of closeness between war and democracy, and their 
potential symbiosis, has recently been brought to life by the fact that virtually all democracies 
are today caught in the threads of a permanent war against ‘terror’ (Keane, 2010). In the name 
of ‘democracy protection’ and ‘democracy promotion’, armies have been sent to foreign 
countries, more than a few democratic institutions have been militarised, and all over the world 
a permanent obsession towards security is washing out dogmas of stability and certainty. 
Having said that, the topic I am here investigating is not merely a question of security and 
safety; on the contrary, it deals with certain embodied characteristics of political power, namely 
violence, coercion, and destructive force. Each of these aspects will be analysed in the 
following pages. 
When she enters Manderlay, Grace is confronted with oppression: a community of 
black people is living in slavery, and a man is about to be whipped. She decides that a new 
democratic system has to be introduced, which would guarantee worth and dignity to every 
single member of the community, despite their past. ‘They can now enjoy the same freedoms 
as any other citizen of this country’, Grace proudly announces. She creates a forum for 
democratic participation in the governance of the community, complete with a system for 
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voting. In Grace’s plans, the transition towards democracy should have been natural and 
straightforward, as a gift we intrinsically possess as human beings.  
Following this perspective, the link between human condition and democracy as a 
system of power have been investigated, amongst others, by Arnold Gehlen, a conservative 
German anthropologist whose works have recently become important in the debate about the 
relationship between the abstract qualities of humans and their environment. According to this 
author, one of the most fundamental characteristics that human beings possess is the 
uncertainty of instinctual life, the under-determinedness of human drives and the 
unpredictability of human behaviour. Such uncertainty and indeterminacy have been 
responsible, in Gehlen’s theory, for an intrinsically-typically human’ need for institutions and 
patterns of behaviour. Humans, he goes on, are ‘deficient being’ unprepared by their biology to 
survival, as the animals are by virtue of their nature: they owe their existence to institutions and 
cultural/moral norms that sustain them, supra institutions capable of making decisions, 
controlling the world, establishing what to do and how to behave.  
Having said that, I would like to stretch this theory a bit further, and include René 
Girard’s theory of political power, which seems to constitute a follow-up of Gehlen’s theory. 
According to the French philosopher, institutions emerged as a result of the first communal 
hunting, during the dividing-up of flesh and bones between the primates and with the first, 
rudimental, differentiation of roles -and leadership- within the group.  
A more detailed analysis is here needed, as we are moving in a rather complicated 
scenario. We are not talking about democratic power yet, but -and more specifically- about 
what power means and how it became such a fundamental, historical, milestone. According to 
Girard, the establishment of power has emerged as crucial in stopping a never-ending circle of 
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violence among early humans, who were primarily hunters. In Girard’s words, during the early 
stages of human evolution, hominids copied one another’s violence in a frenzy of retaliation 
and mimicry that can best be described as the violence of all against all.  At some point, instead 
of being directed at everyone in general (animals and other human beings) and no one in 
particular, this violence became focused on a specific, targeted, victim. How was the victim 
chosen? According to the author, the hominids started to persecute those who presented any 
sign of distinctiveness or weakness outside their group of ‘acquaintances’. Girard calls the 
targeted victim a scapegoat (1986), the symbol of the shift from the violence of all against all 
to the establishment of the first, properly ‘human’ community, a community of individuals able 
to organize themselves in order to fight the danger. He goes on arguing that the communal 
killing of the victim is at the basis of human society and culture, for two main reasons. One the 
one hand, because the death of the scapegoat gives back a sense of peace and ends the 
indiscriminate violence. On the other hand, because killing someone else outside the group 
prevents from killing someone inside the community: the community is safe, defended, 
protected against any other explosion of violence.  
More to the point, how is this violence related to our reflection on democracy? 
Despite Girard does not specifically mention the word democracy, I argue that his theory 
intersects the political meaning of democracy at the point of violence. In other words, the 
scapegoat establishes key in-group/out-group distinctions that maintain the community’s 
structure and cohesion over time against any act of internal crisis, which I believe resembles 
similar mechanisms of social inclusion and exclusion that inform our policy-making strategies 
nowadays. Drawing from Girard, at the beginning of the political there is not a contract or a 
mutual agreement but an act of profound violence: a collective murder. Moving further, 
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societies are not the result of a peaceful agreement between lawyers and politicians, but an 
unstable and variable consequence of human’s instability and intrinsic chaos.  
More poignantly, Michael Mann argues that violence is still a measure of the 
perversion of our modern aspirations to democracy in the nation-state (2005). Democracy, he 
goes on, means rule by the people, and as people ‘naturally’ contain the germs that Girard 
identified in the inclination to violence, democracy itself presents a ‘dark side’ that sups with 
the devils of political violence. Collier (2009) and Hawksley (2009) argue that democracy 
‘kills’, and that the heart of democracy is essentially violent.  
To explore these points more in detail I aim to analyse three specific characteristics 
that are generally considered as synonyms of power: violence, coercion, and destructive force. 
At the same time, the visual and textual analysis of Manderlay will allow me to locate such 
characteristics with its narrative and performances. Finally, I intend to draw some conclusions 
on the connections between von Trier’s productions and the present attempts to debate issues of 
human rights in contemporary democracy.  
 
Violence in Manderlay 
In emphasizing the contingent character of violence, this article aims to remind the 
readers that violence is ‘natural’, a deep-seated predisposition in every individual as a heritage 
we acquired from our ancestors. Girard sets aside the several ways in which democracies 
‘democratize’ violence. But what does violence mean? The meaning of the term itself comes to 
be seen as contestable, as well as flexible enough to be extended to actions that are then 
described and/or condemned as ‘violent’, which mean that they violate the norms of democratic 
civility. And yet, even for Girard the term is quite vague and left undefined: sometimes it 
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seems to be synonymous with blood, and it is not always clear whether it is only human or 
even the environment has some part in it. There are times, says Girard, when violence surfaces 
in terrifying form; other times, violence steps forward as a peacemaker offering the restorations 
of justice and peace. In its own essence, violence is something humans cannot, and would not 
dare, to escape.  In this respect many observers (Girard is just one among many) conclude that 
all political orders naturally rest upon violence, whose ‘real’ or ‘ultimate’ purpose is to contain 
the violent capacities of others (Keane, 2004). Democracies, of course, are no exception. 
Furthermore, democratizing states that have yet to develop more accountable mechanisms to 
control official violence are particularly prone to violent responses, especially when facing 
internal turmoil (Diamond, 1999; Derdzinski, 2006). It might even be said that a distinctive 
quality of democratic institutions is their subtle efforts to draw a veil over their own use of 
violence. There are also plenty of cases, says John Keane, where democratic governments hurl 
violence against some of their own populations. Such violence is often called law and order, 
the protection of the public interest, or the defense of decency against ‘thugs’ and ‘criminals’, 
or ‘counter-terrorism’ (Keane, 2004).  
Manderlay does not escape from this mechanism. Grace is not the only explicitly 
theological word that plays a central role in Manderlay. But, more interestingly, violence is 
intertwined with another, very specific, characteristic of democracy: Law. This relationship is 
quite ambivalent: most of the times, the ‘legitimate’ use of these two instruments goes hand in 
hand with an imposition of violence over specific categories of people. In history, as we are all 
aware, violence has been often justified by virtue of ‘returning a sense of order and justice’ in 
places where, supposedly, there was any.  
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In Manderlay, we first encounter the law when the dying Mam asks to speak privately with 
Grace. She asks Grace to destroy the book, which contains the rules by which the plantation 
operates. Grace refuses, asserting that any decision should be made in public, in front of the 
community, because: ‘It’s my view that anything, no matter what, is best served by being 
brought out into the open’.  
By bringing it out into the open, Grace wants to demystify the Law, destroying its 
authority -through her own authority. This is a point we should not forget, as it recurs several 
times during the film. As Grace encounters difficulties guiding the plantation, she considers 
revealing the book of Law to the community. She is convinced by Wilhelm to wait, as the 
community might not yet be ready. After the community has gone up in flames, and Grace is 
departing, she finally delivers the book to the community as a parting ‘gift’, not before 
realising that Wilhelm, the elderly former slave who had seemed most sympathetic to Grace 
and her project, had written the Law, ‘for the good of everyone’.  
By looking at the relationship between Grace and Law in Manderlay, we can begin 
to understand what the underlying political theological project of the film might involve. 
Before Grace arrives, the plantation is ruled according to a law that for years have guaranteed a 
perhaps inconceivable, but indeed ‘stable’ differentiation of roles and responsibilities. Grace 
overthrows the Law. She thinks each slave, regardless of his or her category, should receive the 
same amount of food and the same privileges. The results are catastrophic, and activate a 
sequence of misfortunes. First, a dust storm destroys most of the crops, which the community 
had planted because, in violation of the Law, Grace encouraged the community to chop down 
the trees in the Old Lady’s Garden. Second, with no money coming in from the harvest, as the 
former slaves refuse to do any king of manual labour, the community suffers an unprecedented 
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situation of famine. Starving to death, Old Wilma steals food from a dying baby and the entire 
community -by virtue of democracy- votes on her life. Grace will execute her, as a form of 
public punishment because the vote has to be respected, despite ‘accommodating’ such 
violence within a system of compassion, shooting her when she fell asleep.  
The exercise of democracy spills absurdities all over the place, generating even 
more violence and chaos.  
Walter Benjamin has explored the linkage between violence and law, allowing us 
to extract a philosophically sophisticated and politically interesting declination of this relation 
(1996). According to Benjamin, the law hides law-making violence and vice-versa: when law 
is suspended, law-making violence is exposed. In some respects, and quoting Girard, that is to 
say that when a crisis is perceived -whether economical, political or institutional- violence 
emerges with a more destructive force, claiming for a target to be killed in order to restore the 
peace as soon as possible.  In Manderlay, Grace perpetuates a double violence: on the one 
hand, she supports the transition to democracy within a securitized system, made of gangsters 
and guns. On the other hand, violence assumes the forms of an imposition over people who did 
not ask for it. This is not freedom; it is just a different law, which perpetuates the same 
mechanisms of violence and counter-violence. The paradox becomes even clearer when 
Wilhelm argues that under the conditions at Manderlay, his people will meet a better life by 
consenting to the old social structures; after all, that is the system they were used to, something 
they can understand, something that worked out in the past, and quite successfully. Beside, the 
fact that armed gangsters must enforce the redistribution of social roles on one piece of 
property with guns and a written declaration is not just also paradoxical, it is also pointless. 
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Again, it does not end oppression, it transfigures it, with different words and methods, but with 
the exact purposes: establishing an order.  
Moreover, it has to be stressed that violence is not only functional, it is also aesthetical: it 
affects the bodies of individuals with asymmetric force and racial twists. This is evident when 
Grace, in order to punish Mam’s family members for their discriminations, orders to get their 
faces painted in brown. Is this really necessary? Is it functional for the transition to freedom? 
We should question how our contemporary attempts to embrace otherness through public 
manifestations of tolerance or declarations of acceptance ‘despite the color of your skin’ or 
‘despite where are you coming from’ are truly genuine and, more importantly, effective for the 
people involved.  
 
Coercion and destructive force 
A democratic order protected and supported by institutions implies the existence of speaking 
and peacefully interacting subjects; this is simply not happening at Manderlay. There is no 
cooperation, and even when little steps towards mutuality are on their way, they are destined to 
fail, such as when, after the dust storm ruins most of the cotton, and the community works 
harder in order to reap the harvest, all the profits are gambled by Timothy. Even in this 
occasion democracy cannot really help: while Grace has sex with Timothy, chaos in fact 
ensues: the workers discover the money raised from the cotton harvest has disappeared and kill 
a man who they wrongly believe to have stolen it (the scapegoat). Grace then discovers that it 
was Timothy who stole the money, and that some of the cotton workers themselves colluded in 
the continuation of slavery at Manderlay. In some respects, this is exactly what Girard said 
about the replication of violence: when a crisis is perceived and the control is lost, violence 
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emerges in even bitterer rivulets, with the purposed of defending the community from the 
threat. Even in Manderlay, when control over the plantation is lost, and also the innocents, such 
as little Claire -who dies because there is not enough food to eat-, fall as a consequence of a 
new order, than the first, and most reasonable, reaction is to recover a previous status quo, the 
slavery in this case.   
Coercion and force are often used as synonyms of power. Hans Morgenthau offers a 
definition that is representative of the existing literature in the field: ‘Power may comprise 
anything that establishes and maintains the control of man over man. Thus power covers all 
social relationships, which serve that end, from physical violence to the most subtle 
psychological ties by which one mind controls another’ (1985:9).  
In Manderlay coercion and force are not, eminently, physical; in their own essence, these two 
elements are expressed in the authoritarian imposition of democracy and morality: it is the power 
of authority, a legitimate form of violence that remains in Grace’s hands until the very end of the 
film. Backed by the gangsters, Grace plays the Leviathan, a form of vertical force, ‘one-to-
many’. This is, ultimately, what social order is all about, where it comes from and how it 
survives.  
As a Leviathan, Grace ‘boils down diffused violence into that bundle of concentrated violence 
that is the State. Whereas interpersonal violence is horizontal and one-on-one, the State 
introduces a new monotheist type of violence, which is vertical’ (Brighenti and Castelli, 2008:5). 
Authority is not less violent than visible violence: lying underneath the umbrella of democracy, 
this declination of power keep the slaves in a state of dangerous coercion, a state that they cannot 
grasp or understand, resulting in Timothy saying to Grace ‘you made us’.  After all, Grace’s 
portrayal as the beholder of a destructive force is, I would say, perhaps the most important fil 
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rouge in von Trier’s trilogy, both depending on Grace’s personal status, as daughter of a 
gangster, and as a result of the violence she was subjected to, especially in Dogville. In this first 
chapter, Grace destroys the community, returning back the violence with no mercy, no 
hesitation, and no chances for a final redemption. The same happens in Manderlay, with Grace 
whipping Timothy (the same slave who was being whipped at the beginning of the film) with 
fury and anger.  
What a relief, at the end. When Grace denudes herself from the tiring implications of teaching 
morality and she finally becomes a public executioner, then she seems to find back the comfort 
of the routine. An ambivalent, inconvenient comfort, being violent just because of an emotional 
burst of hate, or lust, just like anybody else. It is not clear what will happen to Grace at the end of 
the film, perhaps she had to run away because of the painful awareness that she, as the gangsters, 
is addicted to violence. Grace, despite the Christian implications hidden in her name, is made of 
violence, and no lesson of morality, no transition to freedom could have changed that. At the 
same time, it is not clear what will happen to the remaining former slaves, who seem to have 
internalized some democratic values (voting for example), but who remain tied to the old 
customs of Manderlay (Lloyd, 2011). At the very end, von Trier gives the audience the 
opportunity to decide the finale, and no wonder if any of us would decide, ultimately, that it is 
probably better to leave the things as they are, without worrying too much about the future of 
such a small, and probably insignificant, community.  
 
Inconvenient implications  
There is not such community in the world as Manderlay, where objects are painted on the 
floor and characters move as puppet in a theatre of absurd. And yet, every society is like 
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Manderlay, replicating its nature and emphasizing its purposes. It is not easy to deal with the 
fact that democracy is made of violence: as the slaves in Manderlay, we are not ready to 
tolerate such a ‘primitive’ assumption that goes against the supposed civilization of our 
structures of power. What is the final lesson we can learn from Manderlay? Uninterested in 
playing the role of a policymaker, von Trier leaves the audiences to argue about the problem 
and, hopefully, to think about new solutions. The ultimate merit of the film is, therefore, to 
shock the audience and, through this shock, to force us to reflect upon some very popular 
concept at this time: humanity, human rights, citizenship, and liberalism.   
Let’s ask ourselves then. Is there such a thing as ‘human rights’? We should be honest with 
ourselves, and this honesty should come, at first, by avoiding any kind of morality that we do 
not, as the slaves, understand. Caught in our morality while watching Manderlay, we 
immediately emphasize with Grace and her mission to bring freedom through democracy; first 
of all, because slavery is not good, not right, and because this is what we have been told to say. 
But we should really look beyond the plantation, and question the truthfulness of concepts such 
as humanity. After all, in the most recent campaigns against illegal immigration and for the 
securisation of Western borders, we can immediately recognize that there are categories of 
individuals that are not considered as part of our notion of humanity. Therefore, this notion is 
not as comprehensive as our morality would like it to be. How could it be? For centuries our 
political systems, democratic as well as anti-democratic, have been supported over mechanisms 
of inclusion and exclusion that, more or less legitimately, have taught us who to consider part 
of Us and who to consider Them. It always happened and it will always be; this differentiation 
between who can cross the border and who cannot dare to is embodied in our social and 
political institutions.  
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Beside, the growing consensus that human rights are universal has been fiercely opposed by 
critics and scholars in different disciplines. Beyond the more general, philosophical questions 
of whether anything in our multicultural world is truly universal, the issue of whether human 
rights is an essentially Western concept is ignoring the very cultural, economic, and political 
differences in other parts of the world, which cannot simply be dismissed. The philosophical 
objection asserts that nothing can be universal, and that all rights and values are defined and 
limited by cultural perceptions (see Tharoor, 1999/2000). If there is no universal culture, then 
the idea of human rights becomes an unconvincing construct.  
Needless to say, the complexities and multiple nuances that this debate is bringing to the 
fore cannot be resolved only through the analysis of a cinematic next, and neither it was the 
purpose of this article of doing so. Nevertheless, Manderlay invites us to reflect on humanity 
by considering not simply the issue of rights and their unequal distribution, but -first and 
foremost- he invites us to reflect upon the idea of human morality, and its fallacy. There is no 
morality in the attempt to end slavery with a democratic regime that reveals traces of an 
enlightened dictatorship. There is no morality in the imposition of power, whether for 
‘democratic’ or anti-democratic purposes. In itself, the fairytale of liberalism, both socially and 
economically, does not end oppression; it simply replaces one set of values with another while 
the masses remain subordinated to an aristocratic, white, elite.  
This new set of values is possibly even more dangerous than slavery, because it advances 
under the label of universalism, providing a ‘tolerant’ and convenient umbrella for all points of 
view. It is a transformation, not a suppression of conflict, a performance of goodwill that von 
Trier ridicules through the theatrical mise-en-scène and the catastrophic consequences of 
Grace’s wrong decisions.  
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As mentioned at the beginning of this article, von Trier was charged with a lacking 
humanism and an anti-humanistic perspective. It has been said that the liberal, humanitarian 
response of Dogville is a manifestation of extended grace, an apparent unconditional goodness 
that clashes against the final, apocalyptic end. But this perspective is not anti-humanist; on the 
contrary, it is a trope that a liberal democratic regime would cling to in order to wrest some sort 
of moral illustration from the film’s ending. Now that power has been freed from its capture in 
Grace’s old and outdated signifying chain, she can re-consider its use/value to instigate change 
and ultimately justice. If this is a lack of humanism, than we should interrogate ourselves, and 
all the historical and present attempts to make the (third) world a better place with the use of 
diplomatic and no-diplomatic means. If the parable of Dogville is about signifying Grace, then 
Manderlay could be said to be about how Grace learns a bitter lesson by confusing her new 
power (the power from above) with a substitute for the violence she experienced in the 
previous chapter: law and authority (Denny, 2007). And yet, as we said, even this fairytale 
failed to put to sleep the irony.  The old law, Mam’s law, is never really overcome. Grace 
herself has to constantly go back to the book to learn things she did not know about the 
plantation. The old law is the dirty secret in every new order, a secret that must not be unveiled. 
After all, as Wilhelm argues, ‘the slaves are not ready to live in freedom; and even if they were, 
the rest of American society is not ready to receive them’. Are we?  
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